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The Limits of Lemkin
by Scott Straus
Douglas Irvin-Erickson has written an excellent book, lled with insight. The work is an
academic biography, one that situates Raphaël Lemkin within historical and intellectual context.
Irvin-Erickson excels in weaving Lemkin’s ideas into biographical developments in his life. The
reader grasps how Lemkin’s rst conceptualizations of genocide came into being, how those
ideas were situated within legal debates of the day, and how the reception of his ideas propelled
Lemkin to re ne, innovate, and resist. I learned a lot from the book, and I suspect that most
scholars of genocide will as well.
Irvin-Erickson is at his best in presenting the nuances of Lemkin’s thinking. The author
also makes a number of compelling arguments that deserve wide readership in the genocide
studies literature. One is that Lemkin unquestionably saw genocide as a transhistorical
phenomenon that was delinked from the Holocaust, or at least not always tied to it. Many
scholars of genocide will know that the Armenian genocide captured Lemkin’s imagination and
fury, and that his rst efforts at creating an international law against mass violence against
civilians was formulated before the Holocaust. Yet because the coinage and full articulation of
“genocide” was embedded in a book documenting Nazi crimes, some may surmise that the
Holocaust really was the main referent for the new term. Irvin-Erickson’s book dispels that
interpretation.
A second argument that Irvin-Erickson threads through the book was the importance of
culture in Lemkin’s thinking. I took away two main conclusions. First, Lemkin saw cultural
destruction as integral to genocide. Perpetrators destroyed groups, or attempted to, in part
through the destruction of intellectuals, religion, language, arts, and symbols. Second, a central
argument for the need for a convention on genocide concerned the intrinsic value of groups as
expressed through culture. Irvin-Erickson frames the issue around the concept of “cultural
autonomy,” in the sense that different groups have independent cultures and, if destroyed,
humanity loses something crucial.
I learned a great deal more from the book. Almost every chapter brought to light
revelations about Lemkin’s thinking, his struggles, his journeys, and his rivalries, real and
imagined. The book is well worth a read from scholars who teach Lemkin or want to
understand Lemkin’s thinking in nuanced and careful ways. I found the book really helpful, as I
prepared a lecture on the origins of the concept of genocide.
In the spirit of exchange, I want to raise several questions that the book provoked. One
question is: what place should Lemkin have in genocide studies? Clearly, Lemkin invented the
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term, and he developed a concept around the deliberate destruction of groups, which remains
the core idea for what genocide is. Yet as scholars in the eld we know that “genocide” remains
a contested concept. There remain serious differences in understanding what the term
encompasses and whether the term is primarily a legal, academic, or normative concept. Those
differences have shaped and constrained the eld of study since its beginnings, and continue to
do so.
The question is: should we turn to Lemkin to help to solve those problems? Many
scholars do. The problem is that different scholars see different Lemkins, so to speak, and thus
they emerge wielding Lemkin to defend different concepts of genocide. I come away from IrvinErickson’s book less convinced that we should look to Lemkin to nd a way out of the
conceptual differences. Lemkin was not always consistent. He also was an advocate. He wanted
there to be an international law against genocide, and he seemed willing at different stages in
his formulation and defense to articulate different arguments in order to advance that cause. It
is also possible that he was not always a clear thinker. After reading Irvin-Erickson’s thoughtful
account, I emerge an admirer of Lemkin—of his persistence and determination, as well as his
intellectual creativity. But I also do not nd him intellectually reliable, and hence I am not
convinced that deeper dives into his thinking will resolve the problems with the concept of
genocide. In other words, I am increasingly convinced that we should look beyond the
concept’s intellectual origins to understand it.
What should, for example, be the place of culture in understanding genocide? IrvinErickson defends Lemkin as having a non-essential understanding of culture and of groups. Yet
in reading more about Lemkin I remain perplexed as to what his views on culture were.
“Lemkin saw diversity as the wellspring of human creativity,” writes Irvin-Erickson in the
concluding paragraph. At one level, the point resonates—cultures are a source of diversity. But
what does this really mean? What is a group’s culture? Can a group be said to have a culture?
Lemkin’s views continue to strike me as being not being especially sophisticated on this
question.
The importance of groups (collectivities or cultures) is fundamental to the etymology
and conceptualization of genocide. In my work, I have made the argument that genocide is a
form of “group-selective” violence, and hence we can connect genocide to other forms of groupselective violence and distinguish it from both truly indiscriminate violence and individuallyselective violence. I believe my conceptualization is consistent with Lemkin’s coinage and
conceptualization of genocide as the deliberate destruction of groups.
But what kinds of groups fall under a genocide rubric? These questions remain
fundamental for the eld and have divided it since the Genocide Convention came into being. I
do not come away from this book—that is, from a deeper engagement with Lemkin—with clear
answers to these questions. If culture is central to group formation, and that is a justi cation for
having a law on genocide, should political groups (or other non-culture bearing groups) be
considered within a rubric on genocide? Should groups marked by a disability be considered
protected groups under the Convention? Should regional groups or gender groups? Do these
groups have a culture? I conclude from the book that Lemkin was not clear on these questions.
Another key question that Lemkin leaves me confused on: is destroying culture
equivalent to destroying groups? Even more fundamentally, what does it mean to destroy a
group? Irvin-Erickson is persuasive that culture is central to Lemkin’s thinking. But where I
remain unclear is whether cultural destruction is usually, or always, part of a group’s
destruction, but alongside other, more physical forms of destruction or whether cultural
destruction is suf cient for a process to be called genocide? This is not an idle question. The
issue has again resurfaced in relation to the Uyghur populations in China, and the question
remains central for the ways in which different indigenous and colonized people were treated
over long periods of time.
One last question that the book generated: what does the obligation to prevent, as
articulated in the Convention, mean? I was surprised that this question did not receive more
attention from Lemkin. I conclude from the book that Lemkin was somewhat naïve about the
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power of international law. He seemed to think that a law against genocide, and stated
commitments to prevent it, would engender state commitments. But the Convention is
deliberately vague on this question, and Lemkin did not develop a clear understanding—at
least judging from this book—on what prevention means and how it would take place.
I have argued over the years that ambiguities, hierarchies, and disagreements
embedded in the concept of genocide are signi cant limiting factors on the eld of genocide
studies. However, unlike some other scholars, I still think “genocide” is a useful concept, and I
think so because deliberate attempts to destroy groups is an empirical phenomenon in the
world. Genocide is a real form of violence. That statement does not absolve scholars of
wrestling with questions like: to what family of cases does genocide belong, what is a group,
what does group destruction mean, what kinds of groups are subjected to genocide, is the
concept an academic one to de ne types of violence, a normative one to signal terrible
outcomes, or a legal one bound by the Convention? I wish Lemkin could help us answer these
questions. Alas, after reading this book, I am not convinced he can. Maybe genocide studies
needs greater distance from Lemkin studies, or I stand to be corrected.
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